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There are multiple factors that seem inadequate or illogical to me within the building design of Grenville Tower and it's refurbishment and regarding fire escape strategies. Whether the Building Regulations have been met or not. Maintenance Issues: 1. The Dry Risers did not function & so the Fire Brigade could not connect to mains water at high level under pressure to fight the fire from inside the building. 2. No central fire alarm system appears to have been set off - from tenants reports. Was there a central fire alarm system hard wired throughout the building? Refurbishment & Retrofit Issues: 1. There was no sprinkler system. So far fire experts are saying this would have saved lives and reduced the spread of fire or extinguished it, at least inside the building. 2. Did all flats have 1 hour fire doors onto the escape route with adequate door closers? Did some tenants remove closers to the front doors to apartments? Because the question should be asked - how did the fire spread to the stairwell as it appears to have done? 3. There appears to have been no smoke extraction system within the stairwell - why not - especially as it was the only escape route? 4. The Cladding: Other comments here seem to suggest that the cladding system did not meet the Building Regulations Part B for buildings above 18m in height. Celotex claim that their insulation product smoulders but does not burn. In my experience this is not true. It will ignite at a high temperature. It burns with thick black toxic smoke. OSB (the assumed backing board) is compressed timber shavings or sawdust created into board using resin. Resin is flamable. OSB also has a petroleum based coating as a moisture barrier and therefore doubly presents a spread of flame risk. Aluminium - the assumed outer cladding does ignite and a relatively low temperatures for a metal - this was evidenced in the burning of ships bombed during the Falklands War. 5. Looking at footage of the flame spread it certainly looks as if fire stopping was absent in places although much of it was in place (from photos of the burned out panels this looks like a Rockwool type product such as Conlit). 6. The fire spread appears to have been driven by the prevailing wind - hence this plus other factors such as the chimney effect through the cavity - caused rapid spread of flame. 7. Aluminium burns and this must have ignited the window frames in some cases. 8. A new gas main was allegedly being fitted within the stairwell, which was also the only escape route. This is a potential fire hazard. Fire Escape Strategy Issues: 1. Is ONE escape route really sufficient in a multi-storey residential block with a high number of residents? I think the Building Regulations should be revised and a requirement for more than one escape route in relation to the number of people escaping and as an alternative way out of high buildings should be legislated for. 2. The 'stay-put' policy has always concerned me. I have never agreed with it unless in a hospital situation with intensive care patients who cannot be moved. In the event of a fire the building should be evacuated and muster points should be allocated in the surrounding area. This would also allow people to be accounted for. 3. There should be fire drills. Morgan Stanley successfully evacuated all of their staff plus visitors from the Twin Towers because they were well drilled and because staff escaped in pairs holding hands, so that no one was left behind. 4. Was there a fire warden system? This is not only a safety measure but it helps the community to take control of their own safety in an fire and would also help to ensure escape routes were kept clear of debris and rubbish. My points simply amount to saying that multiple factors need to be addressed to ensure the safety of all residential tower blocks. Certainly no combustible material or polystyrene based materials should be fitted to the exteriors - only materials that resist fire and prevent surface spread of flame. I also question the need for a cavity within external insulated cladding panels and this needs discussion vis a vis the need to account for dew point in an external situation.

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